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This paper examines the relationship between hedge fund activism and target firm performance, executive compensation, and executive wealth. It introduces a theoretical framework that describes the activism process as a sequence of discrete decisions. The methodology uses regression analysis on a matched sample based on firm size, industry, and market-to-book ratio. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects. Schedule 13D Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings are the source for the statistical sample of hedge fund target firms. I supplement that data with target firm financial, operating, and share price information from the CRSP-COMPUSTAT merged database.
Activist hedge funds target undervalued or underperforming firms with high profitability and cash flows. They do not avoid firms with powerful CEOs. Leverage, executive compensation, pay for performance and CEO turnover increase at target firms after the arrival of the activist hedge fund. Target firm executives' wealth is more sensitive to changes in share price after hedge fund activism events suggesting that the executive team experiences changes to their compensation structure that provides incentive to take action to improve returns to shareholders. The top executives reap rewards for increasing firm value but not for increased risk taking.
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INTRODUCTION
Hedge funds are agents of change with specific goals that depend on the unique situations prevalent at the target company. Stronger financial incentives and higher levels of personal wealth at stake, light regulation, fewer conflicts of interest, and lockup provisions that restrict hedge fund investors from withdrawing funds all converge to make hedge funds effective in implementing change at target companies. Hedge fund managers have the means and incentive to focus on longer-term valueenhancing activities. In the course of making money for their investors, hedge funds often help overcome classic agency problems at publicly traded firms by by executives, performing removing poorly that ensuring by and strategies, bad challenging make activities management other and mergers sense for the shareholders. Hedge funds have an important role to play in corporate governancethis study focuses on the impact of activism on target firm performance, executive compensation and executive wealth. Hedge funds are largely the target firm executive team, dependent on particularly the CEO, to implement strategies to achieve the hedge fund's desired objectives. Hedge funds may have preferences related to CEO characteristics and may use executive incentives to increase the likelihood of successful activism. In particular, I focus on the following questions: Can hedge fund activism be modelled as a sequential decision process and, if so, what are typical stages? What is the impact of hedge fund activism on firm performance, capital structure, and governance? Do hedge funds avoid target firms with powerful CEOs?
Is the wealth of target firm executives sensitive to stock price and volatility?
The literature finds that activism creates value by driving changes at target firms that improve longterm operating performance and corporate governance (e.g., Bebchuck, Brav, & Jiang, 2015, Katelouzou, 2013 , and Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, & Thomas, 2008 , Carrothers, 2017 . Kahan and Rock (2007) find that hedge funds are critical players in both corporate governance and corporate control. Examples of corporate control activism include improving corporate governance through changes to executive compensation or to the board of directors (e.g., Armour & Cheffins, 2012 and Cheffins, 2013) . Hartzell and Starks (2003) describe the corporate governance role of traditional institutional investors with respect to executive compensation. This paper seeks to understand the relationship between activism and executive compensation and wealth. It is unlikely that the most value enhancing activism tactic is to dramatically decrease executive compensation at target firms. Rather, most hedge fund activism is not hostile -changes often occur through persuasion, not force. The hedge fund depends on the level engagement of the executive team, and particularly the CEO, to implement strategies to achieve the hedge fund's desired results. Incentives for executives could change to reflect the goals of the activism agenda and certain CEO characteristics could influence the initial decision to target a particular firm. I explore the impact of CEO power on activist hedge fund targeting and the sensitivity of executive wealth to changes in stock price and volatility. Bebchuk, Martijn Cremers, & Peyer (2011) define CEO pay slice, CPS, as CEO total compensation divided by the sum of total compensation for the top five highest paid executives at a firm, and suggest that more powerful CEOs typically take a higher CEO pay slice. In my analysis, I use CPS as a proxy for CEO power. This paper makes two primary contributions. First, it extends the knowledge that hedge fund activism is associated with higher levels of CEO turnover and higher levels of post-activismevent executive compensation by showing that, on average, funds do not avoid targeting firms with powerful CEOs (i.e., relative CEO power is not an important factor in activist hedge fund targeting). Moreover, to my knowledge, this is the first paper to examine the impact of activism on executive wealth by quantifying the effect of activism on the delta and vega of target firm executives' option holdings. The results indicate that the CEO has strong economic motivation to improve the share price of the target firm, but no significant motivation to assume additional risk for the firm. Overall, target firm executives' wealth is more sensitive to changes in share price after hedge fund activism events suggesting that the entire top executive team experiences change to their compensation structure that provides incentive to take action to improve returns to shareholders. The top executives are rewarded for increases in firm value but not for increased risk taking. Second, I introduce a general discrete theoretical framework to describe the decision-making process as hedge funds proceed through the stages of an activism campaign.
In addition, this study adds to the literature that hedge fund activism creates value. Hedge fund activism appears to lead to increases in leverage and improvement in value (as measured by q). Overall, the results do not support the argument that activist hedge funds are short-term focused. For example, the temporary decrease in ROA and subsequent decrease in dividend payout are not consistent with short-term focused share price manipulation. Instead, the results are supportive of value creation by hedge funds. The sustained increase in q is consistent with the activist hedge fund agenda focusing on growth opportunities. Hedge funds appear to behave in a responsible manner by responding to temporary decreases in cash flow and return on assets with subsequent reductions in dividend payouts and share repurchases.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents an illustrative example and develops a theoretical model for activism campaigns. Section 3 describes the data summarizes the results and Section 4 concludes.
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Illustrative Example of an Escalating Activism Campaign
One of the more interesting and illustrative examples is the activism campaign at Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd. (Canadian Pacific or CP). This example clearly demonstrates a sequence of escalating stages including direct communication with CP directors and executives, an extensive media campaign, and a successful proxy battle that elected seven hedge fund nominees to the CP board of directors, ousted CP CEO Fred Green, and installed Hunter Harrison, legendary in railroad circles, as the new CEO responsible for driving operational efficiency improvements. Moreover, this example reflects the trend that the universe of hedge fund targets is expanding to include large, non-US firms.
During May 17, 2013 (i.e., up more than 86% from the annual meeting). Pershing Square had built up an ownership stake of 24 million shares (14.2% of the outstanding CP shares worth CAD 3.4 billion). As a testament to the ability of hedge funds to move financial markets, on June 3, 2013 when Pershing Square announced the intention to capitalize some of its gains by reducing its ownership position to 10% over time, share price immediately dropped 3%. On October 23, 2013, CP announced record third quarter profits as a direct result of its focus on efficiency resulting in the lowest operating ratio in company history, and the share price broke through CAD 150. 
Theoretical Framework
The literature provides examples of diverse approaches to modeling activist hedge fund behavior. For example, Brav and Matthews (2011) use game theory to study empty voting, Gantchev (2013) uses a sequential decision model to define hedge fund activism as a series of escalating stages of intervention, and Erlwein and Müller (2011) employ a regime switching regression model in their study of hedge funds. In this paper, I examine the interrelation between the behavior of activist hedge funds and the impact on firm performance and executive wealth at target firms. Activist hedge funds identify undervalued and underperforming companies and then acquire a minority position in the target with the intent of profiting from the increase in overall return (i.e., capital gain or increased dividend) achieved through the exercise and enforcement of minority shareholder rights. A key feature of activist hedge funds is that they acquire blocks of shares with the intention of pressuring management action without obtaining a majority stake (e.g. What motivates activist hedge funds to behave as they do? Assume that activist hedge funds are rationale and given that activism is costly, the hedge fund must expect that the benefits that accrue to the hedge fund will outweigh the costs it incurs. At the time of acquiring an ownership position in the target, the expected benefit of the position must exceed the expected cost. Because the hedge fund holds a minority equity stake in the target company, the activist hedge fund bears all of the cost of the activism but receives only a fraction of the improvement of returns to target company shareholders. Gantchev (2013) models hedge fund activism as a sequential decision process consisting of demand negotiations, board representation, proxy threats, and proxy fights -the activist hedge fund's decision is a discrete choice problem. While there is precedence in the literature to characterize the activism process as continuous (e.g., Tirole, 2001 and Gillan & Starks, 2007) , the decision of a hedge fund to target a particular firm for activism is clearly binary, and once the activist hedge fund is engaged, the fund typically proceeds in an escalating series of discrete decisions. Canadian Pacific Stock Performance Figure 2 . The activism process as a sequence of discrete decisions
Notes: Stage 0 represents the decision of the hedge fund to acquire an ownership stake, αi,0, in target firm i with the intent of agitating for change to unlock target firm value, Vi,_. The hedge fund makes this decision with probability pi,0 based on an evaluation that costs c0. The hedge fund proceeds with activism whenever the expected benefits exceed the (expected) costs. At each subsequent stage, success is defined as reaching agreement with target firm management to make changes that will permit the market value of the firm to reflect its fundamental value, Vi,_. The probability of success at any stage, n, is pi,n. If the activism campaign is not successful at stage n, the hedge fund will choose (with probability 1-p1,n) the better of liquidating its ownership position in the target firm at current market prices, αi,nMi,n, or continuing to the next stage of activism at cost cn+1. In the final stage, N, the hedge fund either succeeds (with probability pi,N) with the activism campaign that will ultimately achieve the firm's fundamental value, Vi,N or fails (with probability 1-pi,N) with the campaign an exits it ownership position at a value equal to αi,NMi,N.
Let
∈ {0, 1, … , } be the activist choice set with = 0 being the Schedule 13D filing stage, and let , be the hedge fund's utility associated with target firm i at activism stage n. Assume that the hedge fund's utility is a function of the profitability of the activism -the decision to pursue firm i as a target depends on the expected benefits exceeding the costs. The benefits realized by the hedge fund equal the pro rata share of the increase in the market value of the firm based on the ownership position of the hedge fund plus any private benefits available exclusively to the hedge fund. Private benefits could include greenmail and empty voting. Greenmail occurs when the target firm agrees to purchase, at a premium to market value, the block of shares held by the hedge fund, on the condition that the hedge fund ceases to engage in further activism at the target. Empty voting (e.g., Brav and Matthews, 2011) occurs when the hedge funds eliminate the economic exposure of its position in the target (through derivatives, for example) while retaining its voting rights. If the hedge fund holds an equity position in a third firm that the target firm intends to acquire, the hedge fund could vote in favor of the acquisition (directly benefiting the hedge fund by increasing the share price of the third firm) while hurting the other shareholders of the target. Widespread adoption of anti-greenmail provisions and the empirical results that hedge fund activism is generally associated with abnormal positive returns at the target provide strong evidence that the impact of private benefits is small (Armour and Cheffins, 2012) . I proceed under the simplifying assumption that, in general, the private benefits of hedge fund activism are negligible.
Let , be the utility of continuing (at stage n) the activist campaign in an effort to unlock that target firm i's fundamental value, , , and , be the utility of exiting by liquidating at current market value,
, . At any stage in the hedge fund activism process, the following must be true:
The hedge fund will continue to the next stage of the activist agenda with target firm i when , > , or
At the final stage of activism (denoted N), the hedge fund either exits at market value or succeeds in unlocking the target firm's fundamental value and will ultimately liquidate when market price equals fundamental value. The decision at N-1 is based on:
The hedge fund will continue to the final activism stage when , −1 > , −1 or
In general, costs, include: a) search costs -all costs associated with evaluating potential targets, b) acquisition costs -transaction and financing costs associated with acquiring the shares of the target company, c) activism campaign costs -all costs (e.g. communication costs, legal fees, and regulatory filing fees) associated with the chosen activism, d) indirect costs -opportunity costs of the lost benefit of diversification and reduced liquidity of owning a significant block of shares in the target. Total costs are the sum of all stage costs up to the decision to exit. I expect stage costs to be monotonically increasing. U.S. security regulation requires firms to make a 13D filing within 10 days of acquiring 5% of the outstanding shares in a publicly traded company with the intent to influence the company (i.e. firms can quietly acquire approximately 5% of outstanding shares in a target firm before having to publically announce activist intentions). It is well documented (e.g., Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008 ) that the share price of the target company increases abnormally in the event window surrounding the 13D filing. If the abnormal return at the target reflects a substantial proportion of the difference between market value and fundamental value of the target firm, the activist hedge funds can capture approximately 5% of the total value of this abnormal return. However, a realistic value for , is greater than 0.05 because activist hedge funds often continue to increase their holdings in the target firm, and activist hedge funds can leverage their effective exposure to returns through derivatives (Armour and Cheffins, 2012) .
For activism to improve utility for the hedge fund, I expect that the target company to be both undervalued and underperforming -the market price of an undervalued, underperforming firm does not reflect the fundamental value of the firm. In principle, any investor can profit by buying the undervalued firm and waiting for the market to get the price right. When a firm is underperforming, it implies that there is something structurally wrong and that by taking action to force change, the activist hedge fund's effort will lead to improved performance at the target company that will ultimately be reflected in increased share price or dividends.
At the time the hedge fund is evaluating firm i as a candidate for activism:
The literature finds that a decrease in target firm share price often occurs in the months preceding the hedge fund's decision to proceed with the activism campaign (e.g., Gantchev & Jotikasthira, 2015 and Carrothers, 2017) . In terms of the model, the utility of the activism opportunity increases and the cost of entry decreases. The hedge fund will pursue target firm i when
    . The probability that a firm will be a target of hedge fund activism depends on the probability that 
DATA AND RESULTS
Data
Per the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, Section 13(d), investors who acquire beneficial ownership of more than 5% of the shares of a publicly traded company and who plan to exert influence over the control of that company must disclose their ownership position and their intent within ten days of taking the position. In addition, firms must identify the reason(s) for acquiring the shares (Brav, Jiang, & Kim, 2009 Table 1 provides a summary of activist hedge fund events (i.e., 13D filings) by disclosed tactics and objectives. Note: The sample includes 1220 events from 1995 to 2007. Panel A presents a summary of the objectives of the hedge fund as declared in the 13D filing with the SEC. "General undervaluation" indicates that the intent of the hedge fund was non-specific, such as improving the company or improving shareholder value. (This information was usually in Item 4 of the 13D filing, sometimes confirmed from news articles. This objective is mutually exclusive of the remaining objective categories). "Governance" indicates one of the following: takeover defenses; CEO/chairman replacement; board independence or fair representation; information disclosure; fraud; executive compensation. "Business strategy" indicates that the hedge fund targets one of the following: lack of business focus; excess diversification; business restructuring including spinning off of business segments; want to block a pending M&A deal involving the company or wants to change the terms; growth strategy. "Sale of target company" indicates that the hedge fund targets one of the following: sale of the company or its main assets to a third party; take majority control of the company; buy-out the company; take the company private. "Capital structure" indicates that the hedge fund targets one of the following: excess cash; under-leverage; restructuring of debt; recapitalization; share repurchase; dividend payment; equity issuance. Panel B summarizes tactics employed by the hedge fund to achieve the stated objectives.
Discussion of Results
Item 4 of the Schedule 13D filing identifies the purpose of the transaction -this information plus supplemental news and internet searches is the source data for the objectives and tactics; Item 5 describes the interest in securities of the issuer which provides specific information regarding beneficial ownership level (e.g., this item provided the information of Pershing Square's ownership position in CP in the previous example). The totals in Table 1 As illustrated by the Canadian Pacific example in the previous section, hedge fund activism often proceeds through a sequence of escalating steps (Gantchev, 2013) . Panel B summarizes (in order of escalating activism) the tactics that activist hedge funds use achieve stated objectives -tactics can be non-hostile or hostile. Non-hostile tactics include passive investment (24.6%), change through communication with the board of directors and senior management (26.4%); and change through seeking representation on the board of directors without a proxy contest or management confrontation (11.9%). Change through formal shareholder proposals or public letters (34.9%) can be either hostile or non-hostile. Hostile tactics include change through the threat of a lawsuit or proxy fight (7.2%), change through proxy contests to replace the board of directors (13.4%), change through proceeding with a lawsuit against the target (5.2%), and change through takeover bid (4.6%). Each of these tactics represents a different stage in the Section 2.3 model. The specifics of a particular activism campaign will determine the number of stages before the hedge fund chooses to exit. In the case of a hedge fund holding a passive investment, there is a single stage with minimal activism costs. The "activism campaign" is successful when the hedge fund sells its stake in the target when the share price returns to its intrinsic or fair value. Table 2 presents summary statistics of firm characteristics based on observations from 1995 to 2007. All data are fiscal year end of the year prior to the 13D filing since hedge funds make their acquisition decisions based on firm information that is available at the time of the decision analysis. Panel A presents data for matched firms, specifically the five nearest neighbors based on market value of equity, market to book ratio, and industry (3 digit SIC code) from the COMPUSTAT universe during the subject years. These three criteria are the basis for generating matched sample regression results elsewhere in the paper. Panel B presents data for firms subject to targeting by hedge funds. Compared to matched firms, targets have: a) lower q, sales growth, and investment in R&D; b) similar return on assets, c) lower yields from equity markets (i.e., combined stock return and dividend & share repurchase yield) d) similar levels of leverage and e) better cash flows. Since market value of equity was one of the matching criteria, the target and matched firms are similar in size. With respect to the theoretical model in section 2.3, the hedge funds are behaving like value investors at Stage 0 -typical target firms are finacially sound with strong cash flows but are currently out-of-favor with the market as indicated by prior period market returns and q. It is reasonable that hedge funds seek an opportunistic entry price. (4.0%) of the sample is female, and tenure is 17.0 years (15.9 years). Total compensation is $3.9 million ($3.7 million). For other NEOs, 5.4% (6.8%) of the sample is female, and tenure is 9.5 years (8.9 years). Total compensation is $3.9 million ($3.7 million).
For the regression analyses in Tables 4 to 6 , the general specification is: This table presents changes in measures of target firm performance in the years before and after being targeted by activist hedge funds. Dummy variables are as indicated. All regressions control for industry (3 digit SIC) and year fixed effects. The dependent variables in the separate regressions are: ROA = EBITDA/prior year total assets, q = (book value of debt + market value of equity)/(book value of debt + book value of equity), dividend yield = (total dividend payments during the year + total expenditures on share repurchases)/market value of equity, leverage = book value of debt/(book value of debt +book value of equity), cash flow ratio =cash flow/total assets, CEO turnover equals 1 if the CEO changes from the previous year, CEO pay equals TDC1 from Compustat, and pay for performance is equity based pay (stock and options) scaled by TDC1. Observations are from a matched sample (5 firms) based on 3 digit SIC code, market to book ratio, and firm size based on market value of equity. Cluster-robust cluster standard errors are in parentheses with clustering at firm level. ***, **, * indicate significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
where , is the firm or executive characteristic of interest for firm i in year t, Di,j is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i will be (was) subject to a hedge fund SEC 13D filing -j years relative to the current year, 3 control for industry (based on 3 digit SIC code) and year fixed effects, and , is an error term. The coefficients represent the abnormal level of the characteristic of interest at target firms compared to normal levels at matched firms in the relative year indicated by j. Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table presents changes in measures of CEO compensation and wealth in the years before and after being targeted by activist hedge funds. Dummy variables are as indicated. All regressions control for industry (3 digit SIC) and year fixed effects and firm size based on the natural logarithm of target firm market value of equity. The dependent variables in the separate regressions are: CPS (CEO pay slice) is the CEO total compensation (Compustat TDC1) divided by the sum of total compensation (TDC1) for the top five highest paid executives at the target firm. Delta is the sensitivity of the CEOs option portfolio value to changes in stock price (i.e. the change in option portfolio value for a 1% change in the stock price). Vega is the sensitivity of the CEOs option portfolio value to changes in stock price volatility (i.e. the change in option portfolio value for a 0.01 change in the annualized standard deviation of stock returns). Observations are from a matched sample (5 firms) based on 3 digit SIC code, market to book ration, and firm size based on market value of equity. Cluster-robust cluster standard errors are in parentheses with clustering at firm level. ***, **, * indicate significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
First, I examine representative changes that take place at a firm when it becomes a target of an activist hedge fund. Table 4 provides insight into the impact of hedge fund activism on firm performance (ROA, q, and cash flow), capital structure (leverage and dividend & share repurchase yield), and governance (CEO turnover, compensation, and payfor-performance). Separate indicator variables indicate if the event occurred within +/-two years of the year of the observation. All regressions control for industry (3 digit SIC code) and year fixed effects and are based on a matched sample. The dependent variables in the separate regressions are ROA, q, and cash flow, leverage, dividend & share repurchase yield, CEO turnover, compensation, and pay-forperformance. The regression (1) results are for ROA, and the significant positive dummy coefficients in the two years prior to the event indicate that target firms have higher operating profitability than comparable non-targets. The column (1) results show the same pattern as Brav, Jiang , Kim (2009) -a temporary drop in ROA following the activism event. The significant, negative indicator variable coefficients (all five at a 1% significance level) in regression (2) confirm that, compared to nontargets, target firms are undervalued and offer more growth opportunities. There is significant improvement in q after the activism event -I reject null hypotheses that the dummy coefficients in the years following the event are the same as the coefficient in the year prior to the event. The improvement in q is economically significant and supports the view that activist hedge funds enact change focused on creating wealth by improving the long-term performance of the target company. The results from column (3) indicate that the target firms have significantly higher payouts (measured by the total of dividend payments and share repurchases) in the three years surrounding the event. However, dividend and share repurchase yield is significantly lower in year t+2 than in year t-1. Regression (4) results provide evidence that that activism is associated with change in the target firm capital structure. Leverage at target firms in the years prior to the event is not significantly different than at matched non-targets. However, beginning in the event year, leverage at target firms increases and becomes significantly higher in the two years following the event compared to the year prior to the event. I reject null hypotheses that the dummy coefficients in the years following the event are the same as the coefficient in the year prior to the event. In the regression (5) results for cash flow ratio, the significant positive dummy coefficients indicate that target firms have higher cash flows than matched firms in the two years prior to the activism event. Cash flows decrease significantly in the year immediately following the activism event. In summary, prior to activism campaigns, target firms on average have higher operating profitability and cash flows and are undervalued compared to nontargets. They experience a temporary decrease in cash flows and operating profitability coincident with the activism event. Hedge fund activism appears to lead to increases in leverage and improvement in value (as measured by q). Overall, the results oppose the argument that activist hedge funds are short-term focused. For example, the temporary decrease in ROA and subsequent decrease in dividend payout are not consistent with short-term focused share price manipulation. Instead, the results are supportive of value creation by hedge funds. For example, the sustained increase in q is consistent with the activist hedge fund agenda focusing on growth opportunities. Hedge funds appear to behave in a responsible manner by responding to temporary decreases in cash flow and return on assets with subsequent reductions in dividend payouts and share repurchases.
I next examine what happens to executive compensation at target firms. Since the hedge fund is largely dependent on the target firm executive team, and particularly the CEO, to implement strategies to achieve the hedge fund's desired results, observable target firm characteristics related to the top executive could change as a result of the targeting (columns 6-8 in Table 4 ). Regarding CEO turnover, the results show two things: a) compared to matched firms, CEO turnover at target companies is significantly higher in the two years following a hedge fund activism event, and b) comparing year t+1 to year t-1, CEO turnover at target firms is significantly higher in the year following the event than in the year preceding. The results in column (7) show that total CEO pay increases significantly in the year following the hedge fund activism event, compared to the year prior, supported by the column (8) result that shows that, in year t+1, pay for performance at target firms is significantly higher than at matched firms.
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) defines named officers as CEO, CFO (chief financial officer), and the other top three highest paid officers of the company, and requires publicly traded companies to disclose compensation for named officers in annual proxy statements. I am interested in determining whether compensation changes at the executive level of the targets provide insight into the long-term or short-term nature of hedge fund activism. In order to test the change in risk taking incentives, I examine the delta and vega of executive compensation (Core and Guay, 2002) . Using their methodology to estimate the size of the executive's option portfolio and the associated sensitivity of that portfolio to changes in stock price and stock price volatility, I calculated delta and vega by executive and year. Delta is the change in option portfolio value for a 1% change in the stock price. Vega is the change in option portfolio value for a 0.01 change in the annualized standard deviation of stock returns. Therefore, I can use levels and changes in delta to better understand how the presence of the activist hedge funds motivates the executive to take action to drive increases in share price, and I can use levels and changes in vega to assess the impact of activist hedge funds on the willingness of executives at the target firm implement risky projects. To evaluate if activist hedge funds have a preference for a certain the type of target firm CEO, I examine the CEO pay slice, CPS (Bebchuk, Martijn Cremers, & Peyer, 2011). CEO pay slice is CEO total compensation (COMPUSTAT variable TDC1) divided by the sum of total compensation (TDC1) for the top five highest paid executives at the target firm. Since more powerful CEOs typically take a higher CEO pay slice, I am interested in whether or not CEO power is influential in the hedge fund's targeting decision. Table 5 presents results for target firm CEO's compensation measures before and after hedge fund activism. I find that the CEO pay slice at target firms is not significantly different than at comparable non-target firms; further, the CPS at target firms does not change significantly after the hedge fund activism event. I interpret this result to indicate that relative CEO power is not an important factor in activist hedge fund targeting. Prior to the activism event, the target company CEO's option portfolio sensitivity to changes in stock price is significantly less than that of comparable non-target companies. In the two years following the event, the CEO's sensitivity increases at the 5% statistical significance level. Economically, compared to the year prior to the activism event, for year t+1 the difference in the change of the CEO's option portfolio is $82,500 for every percent change in share price of the target firm, and for year t+2 the difference in the change in option portfolio value is $112,200 for every percent change in share price. The target company CEO's option portfolio sensitivity to changes in stock price volatility is significantly less than that of a comparable non-target company both before and after the event -there is no significant change in the CEO option portfolio's vega. Combined, the results indicate that the CEO has strong economic motivation to improve the share price of the target firm, but no significant motivation to assume additional risk for the firm. and year fixed effects and firm size based on the natural logarithm of target firm market value of equity. The dependent variables in the separate regressions are: Delta is the sensitivity of the executive's option portfolio value to changes in stock price (i.e. the change in option portfolio value for a 1% change in the stock price). Vega is the sensitivity of the CEOs option portfolio value to changes in stock price volatility (i.e. the change in option portfolio value for a 0.01 change in the annualized standard deviation of stock returns). Observations are from a matched sample (5 firms) based on 3 digit SIC code, market to book ration, and firm size based on market value of equity. Cluster-robust cluster standard errors are in parentheses with clustering at firm level. ***, **, * indicate significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Table 6 presents delta and vega results for the named executive officers other than CEO. For these executives, both delta and vega are significantly lower for target company executives than for nontarget executives across the entire five-year event window. In the year following the event, the delta for other named executives increases at the 10% statistical significance level. Economically, compared to the year prior to the activism event, for year t+1 the difference in the change of the other NEO's option portfolio is $56,300 for every percent change in share price of the target firm. There is no significant change in the other NEO's option portfolio's vega.
Overall, the Table 5 and 6 results indicate that target firm executives' wealth is more sensitive to changes in share price after hedge fund activism events suggesting that the entire top executive team experiences changes to their compensation structure that provides incentive to take action to improve returns to shareholders. The top executives are rewarded for increases in firm value but not for increased risk taking.
CONCLUSIONS
I model hedge fund activism as a sequential decision process. Typical stages include passive investment, change through communication with the board of directors and senior management, change through seeking representation on the board of directors without a proxy contest or management confrontation, change through formal shareholder proposals or public letters, change through the threat of a lawsuit or proxy fight, change through proxy contests to replace the board of directors, change through proceeding with a lawsuit against the target, and change through takeover bid.
Activist hedge funds target undervalued or underperforming firms with high profitability and cash flows. The market responds positively to the arrival of activist hedge funds at target firms; q increases statistically and economically significantly in the two years following the activism event.
Leverage increases statistically and economically significantly following the activist hedge fund taking an ownership stake and remains at high levels. Target firms respond to temporary decreases in return on assets and free cash flow by reducing dividend payments and share repurchases. These findings are consistent with an activist environment in which expected improvement in long-term firm performance causes target firm share price to increase.
Activist hedge funds do not avoid targeting firms with powerful CEOs. Target firm CEOs' pay for performance increases after the hedge fund activism event. The results indicate that the CEO has strong economic motivation to improve the share price of the target firm, but no significant motivation to assume additional risk for the firm. Overall, the results from the delta and vega regressions show that the wealth of target firm top executives wealth is more sensitive to changes in share price after hedge fund activism events -from a governance perspective, post-activism changes to executive compensation and wealth align the interests of shareholders and executives by providing incentive to take action to improve returns to shareholders without increasing risk.
The global hedge fund industry resumed rapid growth after a brief pause during the financial crisis of 2008-09. There is a gap in the literature regarding the impact of the crisis on the effectiveness of hedge fund activists' strategies and tactics and the ongoing relationship between activist hedge funds and target firm executive compensation and wealth. One opportunity for further research is to extend the data set to include the downturn of 2008-09 and subsequent recovery. Another avenue for future research is to use the general theoretical model to develop empirical tests. The possibilities are broad. For example, the probability of a successful outcome and the stage costs may be functions of ownership concentration, institutional ownership, and the investment time horizon of the institutional owners.
